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19 December 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Lt. General Samuel V. Wilson, USA  
Deputy to the DCI for the  
Intelligence Community

SUBJECT : KIQ Coordination Disconnects

Sam:

1. We have a continuing problem which I am sure is the result of inadvertent oversight and on which my colleagues and I are sometimes far from blameless. Still, it is a problem which -- if not resolved -- is going to produce a very awkward complication at some particularly inconvenient juncture. The problem in question is the lack of coordination on matters related to KIQs which too often occurs between your associates and mine when either are doing a KIQ-related task for the DCI.

2. The spread sheet on agency commitments in the Strategy Reports is an almost classic example. Bill asked for such a spread sheet (in his terms, "matrix") in his buckslip to me of 29 November, which I passed along to you (after the intervening weekend) by my note of 3 December. In the latter, I called attention to the matrix, suggesting that [redacted] work with your colleagues in developing it. Shortly thereafter, Dave called Clay [redacted] (he does not remember which) to volunteer his services and was told that the IC Staff had not yet started working on it but would be back in touch with him. I should have followed this up; but, as you know, got sidetracked by my week-long absence in Honolulu.

3. In point of fact, I never saw the matrix until the pre-USIB on 18 December and I was the first member of the NIO structure to see it. (Indeed, it reached me

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25X1 before the pre-USIB only as a result of a call from Dave [redacted] Since I was the only recipient of the matrix, none of my NIO colleagues had had a chance to look at it; though by that time it was already in the process of being formally distributed to USIB principals.

4. The matrix was well done and imaginatively laid out, but the fact remains that the NIOs who supervised the preparation of the Strategy Reports should -- at a minimum -- have had a chance to vet the capsule summary of assignments accepted and the language explaining what this acceptance involved. In point of fact, neither was entirely accurate, particularly the latter, which was inaccurate in a potentially awkward way. (As I asked Colby to note at the meeting, it was not the NIOs who "selected" the tasks, but the representatives of the various USIB members who "volunteered" to accept them. In the real world, the NIOs actually steered these acceptances; but several USIB members, including our colleague Ed Proctor, are very tender-nerved on this point.)

5. For a variety of reasons, including the prevention of such inadvertent glitches, the matrix should have been looked at by my colleagues before anyone else saw it -- including, or indeed especially, the DCI and the other USIB principals. Each NIO should have had a chance to look at the symbolic summary of his own Strategy Reports to verify the latter's accuracy and completeness. Indeed, in my note of 3 December I specifically asked that a draft matrix be developed that you and I could jointly consider before it was shown to Bill Colby.

6. I well recognize that in a fast-breaking ball game where all the players are busy, gears sometimes slip as everyone tries to get his own job done thoroughly within impossible time frames. Nonetheless, I really do think it essential that KIQ-related matters -- especially ones dealing with interpretations of what KIQs mean or contain and ones dealing with performance evaluations -- have to be developed by your colleagues and mine in consultation with each other before they are sent outside our immediate offices. In this, we need to take particular care to ensure that neither of us inadvertently blind-sides the other.

[redacted]

George A. Carver, Jr.  
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers

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Gen. Wilson:

The attached is returned, as you requested.

You're right, it does raise the hackles a bit-- particularly when one examines the origin, and the timing of the DCI's request for "The Matrix" --

George Carver sent 61 draft Strategies (of 69 due) to the DCI on 16 November with the request that Mr. Colby provide guidance on USIB exposure and handling.


The DCI responded on 29 November by annotating the text of George's memo and attaching a Routing Slip on which he wrote, "I'd also like IC to prepare a matrix for presentation and discussion at USIB along following lines: ..."

In turn, on 3 December, George sent you a memo which said, inter alia, "As you will see, he would like to develop a simple matrix for these Strategy Reports which would summarize in very brief compass which USIB member agencies had agreed to accept responsibilities under each KIQ." and "... I have asked [redacted] to work with members of your staff (presumably [redacted]) in developing a draft of the matrix which you and I can consider and then show to the DCI for his final endorsement."

A 2 December PRD MFR concerning a DCI/NIO meeting of that date, contains the following interesting vignette of a portion of the discussion. Re the KIQ Strategies - DCI -- "They are a useful vehicle to "push the machinery to think about what it's doing. ... The IC Staff is preparing a multi-colored matrix" ("if you say so," said Mr. Carver, not quite under his breath) displaying the strategies."



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We are hopeful that your good efforts will be successful in stimulating a representative sample of what sort of a community performance assessment may be possible without a structured and disciplined KEP process.



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